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The general election was held on April 24, a year earlier than required 
by statute. The Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster, explained that he was holding an 
early election in order to ensure that a strong government was in power to meet 
the domestic and international crises which faced the country. "To be able to 
act effectively in the best interests of South Africa, there should be no 
misunderstanding, here or abroad, that it is the wish of the electorate to have 
a strong government in power again to serve and protect the highest interests of 
South Africa." Whether by luck or prescience, the election was held the day 
before Caetaurols government fell in Lisbon. 
An equally importan-t consideration in holding an early election was to 
take advantage of the divisions in the United Party, the main opposition p- in 
Parliament. Internal divisions have been almost the condition of existence of 
the United Party since it was formed in 1934. But the current divisions in the 
party portend a fundamental change in its position as the main parliamentary 
opposition party. The current crisis in the party, a continuation of a conflict 
between "liberals" and 'lconservatives'l in the party which has simmered for years, 
came to a head during 1973 when Rarry Schmz, the leader of the Party in the 
Transvaal Provincial Council, wrested the leadership of the Transvaal Party from 
Marais Steyn, a leading ~conservativew. Steyn defected to the Nationalist Party. 
Schwarzfs victory was the visible sign of the strength of a new group 
of MPS and provincial councillors which had emerged to prominence in the Party 
after the 1970 elections. 
In 1970, the United Party had gained 11 seats from the Nationalists, 
mainly along the Witwatersrand. Although the United Party increased its share of 
the popular vote only marginally in 1970, the election provided a basis for some 
optimistic projections of its future prospects. This was the first election since 
1948 in which the United Party had actually won seats from the Nationalists. Was 
it the turn of the tide? The United Party certainly t h o w t  so. 
The new group in the United Party claimed the credit for the modest 
victory. They had energetically reorganized the Witwatersrand division of the 
party, revamped its tired branches, and replenished the party" finances. The 
emergence of this group seemed to vindicate the view held in the p u p  that the 
Nationalists should be vigorously opposed, in contrast with the mood of '?mee- 
tooism" which pervaded other quarters of the party. 
An issue which crystallized these different sentiments in the party was 
the United Party's participation in the Schlebusch Commission, a parliamentary 
commission appointed to inquire into aspects of national security. The reports it 
issued in 1972 into student affairs and into the Wilgespmit community led directly 
to the banningJ imposed on NlTSAS and SAS0 leaders, the deportation of a leading 
member of the Wilgespruit community, and the -ha~assment of other groups. 
The United Party had run into difficulties in trying to reconcile its 
membership of the Commission with its professed adherence to the rule of law. 
The Johannesburg and Cape Town English press strongly criticized the party for 
participating in the commission. Although it did not base its case solely on this 
issue, the Sundw Times,for decades the United Partyls most important press ally, 
called for Graaffls resignation during 1973, and generally modified its support 
for the Party. The Sun13a.y Times gave considerable support to the Schwarz group 
before and during the election. 
The Party's involvement in the Schlebusch Commission was widely believed 
to be a sign that the Opposition was now a junior partner in an alliance with the 
government. The Progressive Party and students (now very closely affected by the 
Commissionfs activities) attacked the United Party on this issue during the year 
previous to the election. The attack from the Progressives directly affected the 
Schwarz group's prospects as a viable movement for reform within the United Party. 
The Progressives threatened the United Party most seriously precisely in the areas 
in which the reform movement was strongest. The Progressives had made a strong 
comeback in the major urban centres since their disastrous performance in the 1966 
elections. Even though the party won only one seat in the 1970 elections, it had 
narrowly missed winning another. It gained 25% of the popular vote in the seats 
it fought and over 35% in Johannesburg and Cape Town seats. In the event, this 
did not become a problem for the Schwarz group - the Progressives refrained from 
contesting seats in which United Party reformists were standing. All the same, 
the UP reformers and the Progressives draw their support from the same sorts of 
groups, and are based on roughly similar sentiments. 
Schwarz himself avoided confronting his party publicly over the 
Schlebusch Commission. Another MP, Mrs Cathy Twlor, did criticize the Party's 
participation in the Commission, and eventually resigned. Schwarz ran into 
trouble with the conservatives in the party during the months before the election 
over another, rather minor issue - the well publicized, though somewhat innocuous 
"declaration of faitht1 which he signed jointly with Chief Buthelezi, chief 
minister of Zululand,earlier this year. The right wing of the Party could hardly 
object to the somewhat platitudinous contents of the declaration, so they accused 
him of breaching party etiquette in venturing into Natal to sign it without 
informing the Natal party. Natal is the bastion of the United Party's right wing. 
An urgent meeting between Schwarz and Graaff was held, from which Schwarz emerged 
unrepentant. 
By the time the election was announced, the United Party contained two 
clearly defined factions. The press christened the Schwarz group the llYoung 
Turks" and the conservatives the "Old Guard1'. Nomination contests in the United 
Party were followed closely in the press and the results scored as victories and 
losses for the two factions. Graaff, though he avoided openly committing himself 
to either faction, imposed his own nominees on a number of constituencies, often 
against the choice of the local party organization. It is not clear to me whether 
critics were right in swing he imposed conservatives in all cases. He seems to 
have tried to keep the members of the Schlebusch Commission in their seats, but in 
other cases it is possible that losing'nominees tried to attach labels to 
themselves whether or not they fitted. And at Edenvale, where the nomination 
contest was particularly acrimonious, Graaff seems to have accepted the Schwarz 
nominee, the verlig Professor Nic Olivier, against the advice both of the 
conservatives and of the local branches. This was embarrassing to Graaff because 
it meant that he broke a promise to find a seat for M r  George Oliver, a hot 
critic of Schwarz. 
The most important case of a member of the "Old Guard1? being imposed 
was E. G. Malan, a member of the Schlebusch Commission and a close friend of 
Marais Steyn (who was now fighting Turffontein for the Nationalists against a 
former prot6gt5). Malants nomination caused considerable annoyance in the 
constituency. Party workers in at least a number of branches declared they would 
vote for the Progressives. The issue was interesting, not only because Malan lost 
his seat to the Progressives but also because he has sat for the seat for at least 
a decade: the rift in the party had reached the grass roots. 
Five parties contested the election. The United Party put up 108 
parliamentary candidates, the Herstigte Hasionale Party 46, the Progressives 23, 
and the Democratic Party 7. No doubts existed anywhere about a Nationalist 
victory. There would have to be a swing of votes of around 2% to the Opposition 
to oust the Nationalists, and the most generous forecast made on behalf of the 
United Party was a swing of below 7%. The election took the form of a contest to 
decide the shape and future of the parliamentary opposition. The Progressives 
mounted their campaign squarely on the issue of the llqwlity of the Opposition1!. 
Every Progressive Member of Parliament ... will be a 
step towards establishing an effective opposition ... 
Every Progressive Party vote will help along the 
process of constructive change that is already 
starting to take place.... The issue at the polls ... 
will not be llWho will govern in Soxth Africa?" but 
"What kind of Opposition will there be?" . . . If there 
is concern about the policies and performances of the 
Government, there is dismay to the point of despair 
with the chaotic situation which has developed within 
the official opposition ... 
The Progressives emphasized their own effectiveness in ttopposing, not 
appeasing, the authoritarianism of the Nationalist governmentt1. They claimed an 
incomparably better record than the United Party in opposing the Government on a 
wide range of issues relating to the conditions under which blacks live and work, 
and offered economic expansion to the cowtry, tlmaking it possible for an economy 
based on free enterprise to raise the standard of living of all our people". 
The argument that an "effective oppo~ition~~ would create an instrument 
of change towards a "sharing of power" between blacks and whites was developed in 
a number of English newspapers. The Johannesburg Star mounted a campaign to get 
the "best mantt elected, irrespective of party affiliation. 
Shared power is the only means of securing the future 
of the whites and winning the allegiance of the 
voteless millions who will be watching this election. 
So cast your vote ... in the direction of the dynamic 
change which the country needs so urgently in the next 
five years. Vote for the candida:e, irrespective of 
party, who is likely to spur on such change. The 
choice varies widely in different constituencies and 
you may have to weigh more than simple party 
allegiances. Your choice should be for effective 
reform. (Star, 23 April 1974) 
 he even nominated a Cabinet Minister, Mr Punt Jansan, as a reformist. 
Jansen ducked the compliment in some embarrassment, declaring that he was verkranp. 
The press campaign influenced (or corresponded to?) voting strategies 
in a number of constituencies. The provincial council elections were held 
simultaneously with the parliamentary elections, thus giving an opportunity to 
test the extent to which party loyalties were modified by the availability of 
reformists and conservatives. In a number of seats, United Party candidates were 
returned to the Provincial Council and Progressives to Parliament. In the 
Johannesburg seat of Orange Grove, the "Old Guardt1 United Party candidate, 
E. G. Malan, was defeated by the Progressive Party, while his reformist running 
mate won the provincial council election. In Parktown, there was a similar 
difference, though the United Party candidate who lost his seat was not a 
conservative - he was probably the victim of his party's reputation in Orange 
Grove. 
The general results of the election confirmed a shift from the United 
Party to the Progressive Party. The Progressives won five seats in Johannesburg 
and Cape Town seats. A sixth was elected in a subsequent by-election. There was 
a swing generally of around 17/o from the United Party towards the Progressives. 
The Nationalists also increased their share of seats by 4. Neither the Herstigte 
Nasionale Party nor the Democratic Party won any seats. 
Counting reformists in the United Party and the Progressive Party, 
there will be something between a dozen and fifteen llverligtesll on the Opposition 
benches when Parliament meets in October. It is not certain what their 
relationship will be, but it is likely to consolidate unless the United Party 
offers more hospitable lodgings than it has up till now. Schwarz himself is in 
Parliament for the first time, at the head of a fairly well defined group of 
llYoung Turksf1 from the Transvaal. 
A third force is clearly present in Parliament, reflecting a mood in 
the country. What influence it can have over the parliamentary opposition and 
government policy is difficult to estimate. One of the problems that faces the 
UP reformers and Progressives is the relationship between them. The problem 
which Schwarz faces is to decide whether his group can exert an influence '?for 
change1' better by remaining in the United Party or by leaving it and possibly 
facing in the short run the difficulties which confronted the Progressives after 
their split from the United Party in 1959. The Progressives, too, have to decide 
precisely what sort of party they want to be, and what they have in common with 
the Schwarz group.   here are personal rivalries involved between Progressives and 
"Young Turks". The Schwarz-Buthelezi declaration was greeted rather sourly by the 
Progressives. The Progressive Party in Parliament is no longer a single critical 
voice but a possibly ragged chorus. What tunes should it sing, and to whom? 
One symptom of Progressive difficulties became apparent immediately 
after the general election, when the Senate elections were held. The Senate is 
elected by a college composed of all MPS and Members of Provincial Councils in 
each province. The United Party nominated the redoubtable Mrs Anna Scheepers, who 
had been a cloae associate of Solly Sachs in the Garment Workers Union during the 
1930s. Somewhat surprisingly, Mrs Scheepers had joined the United Party last year 
and stood as the party's candidate at Boksburg. She lost the seat. Should the 
Progressives support the United Party's nominee (whom they personally admired) or - 
the alternative if they abstained - let the Nationalists gain an extra seat in the 
Senate? Thgsupported the United Party's nominee. 
But, aside from the tactical problems facing the "Young W k s "  and the 
Progressives, no party defined very clearly what they meant by "change". "Change" 
has become something of a skribbolethinwhite politics, each party refracting the 
idea of change through the rather narrow prism of its own interests, support and 
ideological position. W e n  the Nationalists, while asserting that the government 
did not intend to change its basic policy, drew attention to changes which were 
already taking place and to others which it contemplated. Job reservation, Vorster 
stated, would be maintained, but Itwe do not oppose changes which allow non-whites 
into higher-skilled jobs provided these changes are orderly and with the 
concurrence of trade W o n  leaders". Government policy was aimed at "narrowing the 
gap" between black and white wages, "but for obvious economic reasons it is not 
possible to do it overnightn. The United Party wanted "equality of economic 
opportunityw, trade union rights "for sophisticated  worker^'^, and equal pay for 
equal work. But the party was characteristically vacuous about what it meant by 
change: "It recognises what must change and what should be changed - and what 
cannot be changed", a nervous ditty sung to the sound of feet shuffling in 
different directions. 
The Progressives were more explicit about the need for change, but their 
commitment to bringing about a "free enterprise" economy suggests some of the 
limits which are contemplated by the vanguard of the reformers. These limits are 
even more forcefully emphasized when it is recalled that three of the new 
Progressive Members of Parliament hold senior positions in the -10-American 
Corporation. Qne of them, Gordon Waddell, is a possible successor to the 
chairmanship of the corporation when Oppenheimer retires. Since taking over the 
Schlesinger group this year, Anglo-American is believed to control something like 
400/0 of the investments traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The potential 
the party holds for effecting llchangell rests, then, as much on a diagnosis of what 
changes it is willing or able to contemplate as on what it is capable of bringing 
about. 
Van Zyl Slabbert, now the Progressive MP for Rondebosch, was the only 
candidate who was very specific in what he meant by change. He spoke of the need 
for a "transfer of power1' and specified that this should come about throug;h a 
qualified franchise. It was a specification which hardly needed stating-whatever 
other terrors the Progressives hold for white South Africa they do not want a mass 
democracy. 
One interesting aspect of the Progressive campaign was its anxiety to 
establish the legitimacy of South African political institutions in the eyes of 
the international community and the blacks. Lawrence Gandar, former editor of 
the R .  Daily Mail and long a pill= of the reform movement, echoed Progressive 
sentiments when he mote: 
What we are voting for, then, is a chance to improve 
the quality of performance of Parliament and the 
provincial councils and to indicate to the Government 
our own voteless Black millions and to the outside 
world the direction in which the electorate is moving. 
This is all we can do, but it is important that we 
make the most of it. 
(Rand Daily Mail, 20 April 1974) 
A cartoon published in the Johannesburg on the day after the 
election illustrates substantially the same theme. A group of whites and blacks 
survey a desolate landscape entitled tlSAts political drought". A small cloud 
(Wiligbtened vote") hovers over the scene, from which a few rainhps fall. Over 
the group9s head, the simple legend "Hope". 
The election marked the final disillusionment of any belief that the 
Nationalists can be ousted from power in elections. Fragmentation of the 
parliamentary opposition is a sign that neither opposition leaders nor supporters 
believe any longer in the need to maintain a united opposition. What has become 
an important issue now is the legitimacy of elections themselves. The white 
opposition has always believed that the purpose of elections is to provide the 
framework for a competition for power. Even minor swings to the United Party, 
such as took place in 1970, sustained the belief that there was fractionally a 
chance of the Nationalists losing power in an election. A minor psephological 
industry developed to search the entrails of by-elections for signs of a turn of 
the tide. 
The recognition by the body of opinion that goes to make up the white 
opposition that only the Nationalists can win elections marks some sort of 
crisis point in white perceptions of the political process. If elections do not 
offer the chance of a change in government, what is their purpose and what is 
the role of parliamentary opposition? 
Do the divisions in the United Party and the emergence of the 
Progressives as a presence in Parliament herald the polarization of white opinion 
between reaction and reform which will at least clarify the "real issues" in South 
Africa? Or was it the case that when the champagne corks stopped popping and the 
haze of Hava.nnas lifted over fashionable suburbia the battlefield was somewhere 
else? 
It has long been felt that the United Party's main function was to fudge 
the issues and to obfuscate the monolithic character of white power. But the 
Progressives, too, sustain qyths about the poles of interest in society,which 
suppress the role of capitalism in maintaining a racist society in South Africa 
and which neglect the time scales which are involved in bringing about reform. 
After having initially reacted rather negatively towards the categories of 
"~erlig~~ and l1verkrampt1, the Progressive Party - particularly under the influence 
of the leader Colin Eglin - have incorporated them into their analysis of the 
political situation. The Progressives believe that white opinion is polarizing 
around these groups, and that the polarization is a significant index of a desire 
for change. On this assumption, verligtes are to be found in all parties, in the 
Cabinet, the public service, and above all in the higher reaches of the business 
community. On this assumption, the election would show the breadth of support 
which is already explicitly committed to goals. %t it would also suggest 
that this explicit commitment is only a fraction of its real proportions. The 
assumption underlying reformist and Progressive activity is that there is a vast 
hinterland of implicit support for change. The function of these groups is to 
articulate the issues which will bring this support into the open and clarify 
the issues for those who cannot declare themselves openly. 
In turn, the belief in the division between reformists and 
reactionaries rests on a set of assumptions about the role of economic development 
in bringing about changes in race relations. The belief that economic development 
will transform social and political relationships has assumed the proportions of an 
orthodoxy in the reform movement. Racial divisions will be displaced as economic 
development creates the opportunities for the upward mobility of whites. Whites 
will abandon the tenacious prejudices formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and case-hardened during the period after the first world war. 
This is not the place to assess the doctrine. But it may now be seen 
not only as one defence of industrial capitalism in South Africa but also as an 
argument conferring authority upon the "melioristt1 case. The reformists are as 
anxious about the international situation as they are about their position in 
domestic politics. The news from Lisbon on the morrow of the election deepened 
their anxiety. 
It is possible that the role they might assume as spokesmen for 




The statistical analysis which was under way in Johannesburg when I left had not 
yet reached me by the time I wrote this piece. If.it has arrivea in time for the 
seminar, I will discuss it then. 
The statements of paty policy are taken from the Johannesburg press and from 
party manifestos. The estimate of the Progressive Party's performance in 1970 
is cited from K. A. Heard, General Elections in South Af-rica, 1943-1970 (oxford 
University Press, 1974), p. 213. 
*This paper was given in October 1974, and is reproduced here as originally 
presented. 
